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Christian Love, Material Needs, and 
Dependent Care: A Feminist Critique of the 
Debate on Agape and "Special Relations" 
Sandra Sullivan-Dunbar 
THE RECENT CONVERSATION WITHIN CHRISTIAN ETHICS ABOUTTHE RELA 
tionship between universal obligations and particular, intensive relations—be 
tween agape and "special relations" —largely accepts Gene Outka's formula 
tion that these are separate and competing moral claims that must be balanced 
within the Christian moral life. I examine the relationship between agape and 
special relations through the lens of dependency and dependent-care rela 
tions. Attention to dependent care and the material needs addressed within 
them raises questions about the sharp division between universal and partic 
ular obligations. Drawing on the work of feminist philosopher Eva Feder Kit 
tay, I argue that an adequate understanding of Christian love must take account 
of both our fundamental human equality and the pervasiveness of dependency 
in human life. Such an understanding of Christian love reveals that agape is a 
matter of personal and social ethics. 
Introduction 
I 
begin with two very general claims. Dependency, neediness, and therefore 
dependent care are central, inevitable aspects of human existence. Some form 
of basic human equality is also a modern ideal with which we cannot, and 
should not, dispense. Many would say that this ideal of equality is more than an 
ideal. It is also a concrete reality: human persons are, ontologically speaking, in 
vested with a dignity that gives us a fundamental equality, and we should be 
treated accordingly. But these two realities, dependency and equality, stand in a 
certain paradoxical tension, because when we are dependent on another, there 
are important ways in which we are not equal to that other, and many groups of 
persons have had their dependency exaggerated and enforced precisely to ex 
clude them from equality. As a result, advocates of liberal forms of equality have 
often avoided facing squarely the fact of universal human dependency. 
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In the last two or three decades, a host of feminist scholars in a variety of 
disciplines have argued for a notion of equality that can also incorporate the 
pervasive reality of human dependency and dependent care, such as care for 
young children, frail elderly persons, and persons with disabilities.1 They be 
gin from the premise that such dependency has been obscured in much mod 
ern liberal thought. Although this work spans economics, sociology, history, le 
gal thought, and political theory, it shares central themes. One of these themes 
is the problematic nature of certain liberal conceptions of the person as a fully 
autonomous chooser. Another theme is a critique of the specific form of the 
split between the public and private spheres that arose through the processes 
of the industrialization and commercialization of society, processes that also re 
sulted in the sequestration of much dependent care in the "private" or domes 
tic sphere. Both the conception of the person as a fully autonomous chooser 
and the public-private split operate to highlight equality while masking human 
dependency. 
We can also see these two realities of dependency and equality operating in 
Jesus's own explication of the nature of Christian neighbor-love, the parable of 
Good Samaritan. Most commentators on this parable highlight the surprising 
identity both of the man who fell among thieves (unidentifiable, and likely an 
enemy), and of the one who helped him (a member of a hated, or at least es 
tranged, group).2 This aspect of the parable lends itself to interpretations of 
Christian love that support an equal claim to inclusion and care of all persons; 
we are forbidden to exclude anyone, even strangers or enemies, from the cir 
cle of human concern. But we should not forget what the unfortunate traveler, 
as a person possessed of this equal claim, is entitled to: The traveler is entitled 
to extravagant care in response to profound dependency. The traveler is as vul 
nerable as a newborn: naked, exposed, completely lacking in the physical and 
cognitive resources to care for himself. 
I argue here that an important recent understanding of Christian love, Gene 
Outka's understanding of agape as "equal regard," appropriately highlights our 
fundamental and universal equality but needs correction from the perspective 
of dependency and dependent care relations.3 This need for correction becomes 
clear through an examination of the debate over Outka's formulation of "the 
problem of special relations," or particular, intensive bonds with our kin, 
friends, colleagues, fellow citizens, or coreligionists. Outka discusses "special 
relations" or "particular roles and practices" briefly at the end of very long works 
on Christian love.4 And yet these discussions have generated more controversy 
than any other aspect of his work. I suggest that this is because special rela 
tions become, in Outka's work, a marginalized repository for the pervasive and 
basic human realities of dependency and material need. 
Outka's concern with equality is also a deep concern with justice, a con 
cern that all should be included in the scope of agape. He is concerned that 
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our commitment to those nearest and dearest to us might forestall our com 
mitment to those who are less "attractive" or less closely connected to us. 
Outka is correct to be concerned about the potential for special relations to 
become sites of injustice, but because he does not consider that so many spe 
cial relations are dependent care relations, the place where the most basic hu 
man needs are fulfilled, he fails to see the shape that this injustice often takes. 
An examination of the current global state of dependent care relations reveals 
that such relations are the arena of deep exploitation along lines of gender, 
race, class, and nationality. I argue that the marginalization of dependent care 
relations in Outka's understanding of agape parallels the marginalization of 
dependent care relations in current global social and economic structures. I 
further argue that an account of Christian love that incorporates both equal 
ity and response to dependency must be a social ethic in addition to a per 
sonal ethic because to provide for the basic material and care needs of each 
person equally requires that we collaborate through social, political, and 
economic institutions. 
Responsibility for dependent care has largely accrued to women, so my cri 
tique of Outka's work is a feminist critique. Early feminist work on agape was 
largely hospitable to Outka's thought; feminists thinkers tended to target crit 
icism at self-sacrificial notions of Christian love.5 From this perspective, Outka's 
understanding of equal regard, which includes the self within the scope of 
equality, seemed a great improvement over understandings of Christian love, 
which seemed to encourage women to accept oppression.6 However, feminist 
theory as a whole has grown in its own understanding of the complexities of 
achieving equality, especially as the voices of women marginalized by race, 
class, and nationality have entered the conversation. If we do not attend to those 
dependency needs currently consigned to the domestic sphere, some will 
achieve equality at the expense of other marginalized persons who take up our 
dependent care duties for us. Therefore, drawing on more recent feminist work 
on dependency and equality, I want to deepen the feminist critique of agape as 
equal regard. 
In the first section I provide an overview of a contemporary crisis in depend 
ent care relations; there is a deficit of care relative to the need for care, and 
caregivers are widely exploited. In the second section I explicate and critique 
Outka's treatment of agape and his corresponding notion of special relations, 
and briefly review other thinkers in the subsequent debate about special rela 
tions. I do not believe that the debate as a whole has yet reached to the heart 
of the problem with Outka's theory—that it seeks equality by obscuring depen 
dency. In the third section, I draw on the work of feminist philosopher Eva 
Feder Kittay to show the relevance to Christian ethics of one contemporary 
attempt to bring together a liberal conception of equality with the pervasive 
human realities of dependency and dependent care. 
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The Contemporary Care Deficit 
Feminist sociologists and feminist political theorists have begun to speak of a 
"care deficit." They point to the very large numbers of children, frail elderly, 
permanently or temporarily disabled, and sick persons, both in the United 
States and globally, who require intensive care from others but often are not 
getting it, are getting inferior care, or are getting care from caregivers who are 
themselves exploited through poverty-level wages, poor working conditions, 
and social invisibility. 
This care deficit is largely the result of demographic and technological fac 
tors. Our population is aging; life spans are increasing; medical technology is able 
to save the lives of many people who will nevertheless require significant assis 
tance with their daily activities; and women, especially upper- and middle-class 
white women, have entered the workforce in increasing numbers. However, a 
significant reason for the care deficit is that care is marginalized in our society. 
Particularly in the United States, dependent caregiving is considered a private 
activity rather than a service to society. In the words of feminist economist Nancy 
Folbre, for example, our society sees children as "pets," that is, consumer choices 
made by parents for their own amusement and pleasure.7 Thus, society feels ab 
solved of any responsibility to support parents in their caregiving work. 
This view of child rearing as a private hobby rather than as a contribution 
to society is a modern development. One way to recognize this is through 
changing conceptions of activities counted as "work" or economic contribu 
tions. In the industrial era, as economic activity moved outside of the home, 
the conceptual realm of the "economic" gradually shrank to encompass only 
those items or labor that were subject to trading and exchange, and care activ 
ities were dropped from the conception of the economic. Folbre notes that in 
the mid-nineteenth century, both Britain and the state of Massachusetts counted 
domestic work as productive work in census and economic statistics.8 By the 
1920s, domestic work had disappeared from official measures of economic ac 
tivity. The decision to raise children is not, however, primarily a matter of con 
sumption governed by preferences; dependent care is a productive activity. De 
pendent care brings into being or maintains in being mature, contributing 
persons at great expense of time, energy, and material resources to those pro 
viding the care. Care for young children brings to maturity the next genera 
tion of caregivers, those who will care for us, direcdy or financially, in our old 
age, whether we have personally raised any of the next generation or not. Thus, 
in a very real sense, parents are subsidizing society as a whole.9 So are providers 
of other sorts of dependent care. For example, the market value of the unpaid 
work that family caregivers do in providing for frail elderly relatives was esti 
mated at $375 billion, or 2.6 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 
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2007.10 Dependent care also renders the caregiver vulnerable; it prevents the 
caregiver from competing on an equal basis in the world of "fully autonomous" 
participants in market employment. 
As more women have moved into the workforce, the cultural notion that 
dependent care is a private preference and responsibility has given rise to se 
rious problems balancing work and family. Quality child care is difficult to find 
largely because it must be paid for out of the parents' wages, making child care 
wages extremely low, even while child care expenses are very high relative to 
the earnings of most families. Child care providers are thus treated unjustly even 
when they find their work deeply rewarding. Those who cannot find or afford 
child care may move in and out of the workforce. The average woman will take 
twelve years out of her working life to care for children or elderly parents.11 
These lost work years take a serious toll on her financial security and retire 
ment income. Other women try to work part-time, a strategy that also has a 
dramatic negative effect on wages due to employers' sense of a right to what 
legal scholar Joan Williams calls the "ideal worker": "a worker who works full 
time and overtime and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child-rear 
ing."12 And, as Folbre notes, because the benefit structure of the Social Secu 
rity program has not kept pace with the changing shape of families and work 
patterns, families with two working parents end up subsidizing nonparents and 
traditional breadwinner/homemaker families in their old age, paying much 
higher Social Security taxes in return for the same level of benefits.13 In sum, 
the fact that we do not count dependent care as work, and do not reimburse 
dependent caregivers for the subsidy they provide to society, places a serious 
financial hardship on caregivers, especially women. 
If dependent care presents financial challenges to middle-income women, 
it places lower-income women in a cruel situation. From 1935 to 1996, the 
United States provided at least minimal financial support to poor single moth 
ers through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.14 
With the passage of the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) pro 
gram in 1996, this entitlement was rescinded in favor of block grants to states, 
grants that were not indexed to inflation.15 The new program places time lim 
its on benefits and imposes work requirements on a significant percentage of 
those receiving benefits. Unfortunately, many recipients have strong barriers 
to employment, in many cases including the need to care for a disabled family 
member. States have a strong incentive to deter such families from receiving 
benefits; the number of eligible families actually receiving benefits has dropped 
from 84 percent in 1995, the year before passage of TANF,16 to about four in 
ten eligible families (40 percent) in 2007.17 Those who have successfully moved 
from welfare to work under TANF are not generally working year-round; when 
they do work, they average wages of $7—$8 per hour, not much more than the 
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cost of decent child care for a single child. Ironically, the program does not con 
sider caring for one's own children to be work, but recipients can meet the work 
requirements by caring for the children of others. 
Often, women help to close the "care deficit" by employing other women 
to assist with their caregiving duties under exploitative conditions. In poorer 
countries, this care deficit too often results from the phenomenon of the "fem 
inization of immigration," a trend in which young women immigrate to serve 
as nannies and maids in wealthier countries.18 They thereby help lessen these 
countries' care deficits while leaving their own children behind for years at a 
time in the care of grandmothers, aunts, or neighbors. In some countries, a very 
large number of families are affected by their parents' migration; in the Philip 
pines, 3 0 percent of children have at least one parent working overseas.19 These 
mothers are able to provide for their children economically in ways they sim 
ply could not do in their home countries, but they are rarely able to visit their 
children and often describe themselves as more attached to the children for 
whom they are paid to care than to their own offspring. Thus, Arlie Russell 
Hochschild notes, "In this sense, we can speak about love as an unfairly dis 
tributed resource—extracted from one place and enjoyed somewhere else."20 
Gene Outka and the Agape/Special Relations Dyad 
From the perspective of this global "care crisis," I reexamine a recent debate 
in Christian ethics about the relation between agape and special relations. The 
relationship between the inclusivity of neighbor-love as defined by Jesus and 
the importance of particular, intensive bonds has been a question in Christian 
ethics since the beginning of the tradition. However, the contemporary debate 
is largely sparked by Gene Outka's important 1972 work, Agape: An Ethical 
Analysis. Outka states that the purpose of this work is not to put forth his own 
theory of Christian love but rather to examine and bring clarity to the large 
body of work on Christian love produced between 1932, with the publication 
of Anders Nygren's important Agape and Eros, and his own writing in 1972.21 
Among these widely varied treatments of Christian love, he seeks some com 
mon normative content. Outka identifies the following features, which he sum 
marizes with the term "equal regard": Agape is "a regard for the neighbor 
which is in crucial respects independent and unalterable. To these features 
there is a corollary: the regard is for every person qua human existent, to be 
distinguished from those special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish partic 
ular personalities from each other."22 Outka then explicates this definition fur 
ther, drawing on Karl Barth: Agape means "identification with [the loved one's] 
interests in utter independence of his attractiveness."23 In a lengthy 1992 arti 
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cle, Outka identifies a similar content of Christian love with the term "univer 
sal love."24 
By setting up his inquiry as a descriptive one, Outka invests this notion of 
equal regard with the appearance of the authority of tradition. But it is im 
portant to question the fully descriptive nature of his project. It is difficult to 
determine how he extracts a notion of equal regard as the normative core of 
meaning in, for example, Catholic personalist theories of Christian love as mu 
tuality aimed at communion.25 Such theories would seem to highlight precisely 
the particular qualities of the persons loved, and to valorize love relationships 
in which the lover receives something in return for her love. These thinkers 
would of course affirm a basic and universal regard for human dignity, but this 
is not the core of their discussions. One suspects that equal regard is a least 
common denominator, an element that no contemporary understanding of 
Christian love can do without, rather than the core of each of the theories 
Outka examines. I am inclined, therefore, to treat equal regard as Outka's pre 
ferred notion of Christian love rather than as the neutral consensus of mod 
ern Christian tradition. However, regardless of the degree to which Outka's 
own ethical and theological commitments impinge upon this definition of 
agape, the conception itself is open to debate; even a "majority opinion" based 
on a survey of theories of agape from 1930 to 1972 is bound to incorporate 
a particular historical perspective on the nature of love.26 Recent work in 
feminist philosophy and political theory has pointed to the ways in which 
moral theory from this timeframe obscures and marginalizes concerns of 
dependent care.27 
Within the framework of agape as equal regard, particular, intensive rela 
tionships—Outka calls them special relations—become problematic because, 
in his words, "agape enjoins one to attribute to everyone alike an irreducible 
worth and dignity, to rule out comparisons at the most basic level, to refuse 
to defer to the particular social and ethnic groups to which individuals hap 
pen to belong."28 In contrast, special relations, as Outka constructs them, are 
based on particularity and preference. Outka's conclusion is that special rela 
tions do not express agape, although they may set the boundaries wherein spe 
cial relations come into their own; in his example, we remain faithful to our 
spouses even during periods when we do not feel deeply in love with them. 
Outka acknowledges the common-sense understanding that some special re 
lations are morally compelling but implies that they must have a different 
grounding, separate from agape, the elucidation of which he does not consider 
part of his project. 
Thus Outka bequeathed to Christian ethics a dualistic understanding of 
agape and special relations, universal and particular commitments: These have 
mutually exclusive moral groundings, they compete, and we must balance them. 
In Outka's own words, "Agape is the guardian in rather than the direct inspi 
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ration of every special relation."29 This distinction in kind—between agape and 
special relations—is the direct result of defining them solely in terms of our 
internal attitude toward another person, for we cannot both regard that per 
son's attractiveness and disregard it at the same time. While intention is a key 
aspect of the moral nature of human actions, the act itself is also important, 
and concrete acts of care may look very similar whether we extend them to 
ward our children or toward strangers and enemies. There is always a danger 
that special relations will tramp agape or universal regard. As Outka argues, 
"obligations pertaining to them may become the effective center of gravity, so 
urgent and really ultimate that they swamp universal human dignity as such."30 
I want to transcend the assumption of two sharply differentiated obligations, 
described as agape and special relations. When we attend to experiences pre 
viously rendered invisible, particularly the experience of dependent care rela 
tions, we begin to see that our obligations to those near and dear to us are pro 
foundly interrelated to our obligations to "strangers" and "enemies." In 
particular, when we notice that both kinds of obligation involve meeting the 
basic material needs of others, then this shared concern with need fulfillment 
becomes more important than our internal attitude of either regard for or dis 
regard for the "attractiveness" of the object of our love. When we recognize 
that dependent care occurs within the realm of special relations, and that most 
dependent care is done by women, we must also recognize that the mutually 
exclusive dyad of agape and special relations is a deeply gendered construct. 
In arguing that we must overcome the sharp division between agape and spe 
cial relations, I do not mean to imply that there exists no tension at all between 
our particular obligations and a more universal concern. Certainly, morally 
sensitive persons straggle with questions about, for example, how many mate 
rial resources to spend on their children's education versus feeding hungry 
families in their communities. However, we should not therefore conclude that 
our actions on behalf of our children are somehow excluded from the category 
of agape, and that such relations can only be restrained or protected by agape. 
For one thing, our children may be the ones who are hungry; we should not 
assume that the only ones concerned about agape are those privileged with the 
choice about what to do with extra funds. Such an assumption creates implicit 
passive "others": the ones who, unlike "us," are needy, call on our help, and are 
not agents of agape.31 Furthermore, it seems to me that a conceptual appara 
tus that divides our relations into "preferential" and "nonpreferential" fos 
silizes these tensions. The tensions are actually subject to social shaping and 
alleviation if we acknowledge the fact that social structures mediate our wider 
obligations. As we live our lives in the concrete, we can ask, who is bearing the 
burden of these tensions? Who lives in them, who feels them the most acutely? 
I submit that it is precisely dependent caregivers, particularly those who are 
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poor and marginalized, who will feel these tensions the most acutely. We should 
not accept real tensions and conflicts between moral claims without critically 
examining how these tensions are exacerbated for some by social, cultural, and 
public policy institutions. 
Critique of Outka 
Much in Outka's work deserves great appreciation. Outka is a very careful, nu 
anced, and precise thinker; after setting out his initial premises about agape, 
he explores their implications with balance and thoroughness, clarifying many 
conceptual inconsistencies in the body of work he addresses. Outka's assertion 
that agape refuses to attend to ethnic or social groups shows his concern to fore 
stall racial or sexual discrimination. He is deeply concerned to put forth an ethic 
that will condemn the violation of the integrity or dignity of any human be 
ing, and he reminds us that this condemnation, in itself, is no small thing: "we 
should guard against any sanguine assumption that minimal prohibitions against 
harming others hold as a matter of course."32 Outka has evidenced a concern 
not just for universal respect but also for universal well-being for all persons 
through his writings on issues such as the moral grounding of universal health 
care.33 Nevertheless, I contend that the conceptual apparatus of agape and spe 
cial relations that he uses cannot ultimately help forward these concerns. 
As noted in the introduction, though the problem of special relations is dis 
cussed only briefly by Outka, this topic has inspired a heated debate among Chris 
tian ethicists. Outka seemed to see special relations as a secondary issue, a prob 
lem to be addressed later now that the main business of determining the content 
of agape was finished. But in reality, special relations cannot be seen as second 
ary; Outka's understanding of special relations is the necessary corollary to the 
very way in which he has understood agape. Agape does not regard attractiveness, 
so we must have a category for those relationships that do regard the attractive 
ness and particular qualities of the other. Thus, a critique of Outka's notion of 
agape can help us untangle the so-called problem of special relations. 
I believe that the core problem in Outka's understanding of agape as equal 
regard is that it focuses on what agape disregards, that is, attractiveness and par 
ticularity, rather than what agape regards, that is, concrete human need. If we 
look at the parable of the Good Samaritan and broader scriptural testimony, 
we cannot avoid the implication that agape is focused on seeing and respond 
ing to need. A second and related problem is that Outka approaches his analy 
sis with a strong methodological individualism. Outka notes briefly that equal 
regard "does apply to social as well as personal relations," because it considers 
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distant others whom I may affect, and because it attempts to foster commu 
nity.34 However, his analysis still begins with the separate, autonomous moral 
actor making decisions about serving his own interests versus those of others. 
This individual actor may then reach out to others to "foster community." I 
argue that agape is a matter of social ethics as well as a matter of personal ethics, 
but I mean something different by this statement than what I understand Outka 
to mean. I begin from a picture of the moral agent as primordially dependent 
on basic care to achieve maturity and moral agency, and dependent in a range 
of ways on social institutions. Such institutions (the family, but also the econ 
omy, government, and civil society) thus make agape more or less possible. In 
our contemporary economy, for example, we cannot meet the basic needs of 
others without participating in complex and interdependent market structures. 
My contention that Outka's understanding of agape is not primarily focused 
on need fulfillment requires some defense, for as I noted, Outka does make oc 
casional references to agape as concerned with the positive well-being of the 
other. But these occasional references bump up against the problem of "uni 
versality." Outka notes that equal regard is "universal in that not a single per 
son is to be excluded, though of course de facto not all come into range."35 He 
also acknowledges that very many people may "come into range" in the sense 
of being affected by our actions.36 But a conception of agape that is simulta 
neously universalist and focused on the individual moral agent must necessar 
ily be primarily negative, in the sense of abstention from harm, or attitudinal, 
in the sense of a basic respect for persons. We cannot do much for others as 
individuals in proportion to the vastness of human need in the world, even of 
all persons who "come into range." Furthermore, when we respond to need in 
any substantial way, we soon find ourselves in something that looks very much 
like a special relation in that we find ourselves bound to the person we are help 
ing by more than simply dutiful identification; we will have entered the com 
plex mix of affection and duty that marks caring relationships. Likewise, we may 
find that our commitment to the needy person precludes our similar commit 
ment to some other needy persons. 
There is one point at which Outka moves away from the individual as the 
agent of universal agape, but this exception illustrates the problem with plac 
ing any positive and universal obligation within an individualist context. In his 
treatment of agape and justice, Outka remarks that in contemporary discussion, 
"the stress is on justice as a predicate of societies and their actions and institu 
tions."37 He adopts this stress as well, and argues that agape is closest to a no 
tion of justice as need fulfillment. While this asserted correlation between 
agape and justice as need fulfillment implies that agape, too, is primarily fo 
cused on need fulfillment, there is a problem with Outka's analysis: namely, he 
stresses agape as need fulfillment only when he is speaking of it as an attribute 
of social institutions (as a correlate to justice). As we have seen throughout the 
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rest of his analysis, Outka holds to a very strong methodological individualism. 
This subtle switch from the individual as agent of agape to social institutions 
as agents of agape is problematic because an individual could never fulfill the 
material needs of all equally. The switch obscures the way in which Outka's con 
struction of agape necessarily backgrounds need fulfillment. A social institu 
tion can facilitate the universal fulfillment of needs, however. This fact suggests 
a different way of understanding one aspect of the relation between love and 
justice, and specifically between the aspect of love that involves fulfillment of 
positive needs and the distributive aspect of justice. We can think of the rela 
tionship this way: It is the work of distributive justice to enable love to occur 
universally, within our particular or special relations. This may require redis 
tribution of the material goods necessary to meet basic needs, and it may re 
quire protection against exploitation in dependent care relations. This concep 
tion of the relationship between love and justice does not conflate the individual 
agent of agape with social institutions, and it can honor the role of particular, 
intensive relationships in expressing agape. 
Thus, Outka's understanding of agape as equal regard—because it is both 
universalist and focused on the individual agent—issues in an internal, attitu 
dinal understanding of Christian love, one that abstains from considerations of 
attractiveness rather than focusing on fulfillment of concrete needs. Three as 
pects of Outka's discussion of special relations show the problematic impact of 
this core problem in his definition of agape. First, Outka constructs special re 
lations as expressions of preference. Outka repeatedly describes special relations 
as grounded in the other person's talents, achievements, and merit, or at least 
in shared interests and values. In other words, special relations are defined by 
their grounding in the "attractiveness" that equal regard is said to ignore.38 
Outka does not consider the fact that we exist in a social and kinship network 
that imposes many of our moral obligations before we make any choices about 
where else we shall bestow our time, energy, and affection. Nor does he con 
sider how deeply entwined these relations are with provision for our basic ma 
terial needs. 
This focus on special relations as expressions of preference is related to a 
second feature of Outka's construction of the "problem of special relations": 
These relations are said to pose a special danger because of the depth of our 
own self-interest. To corroborate, the overview of dependent care relations pre 
sented here bears witness to our capacity for injustice in the service of the 
needs of our own dependents. Still, my overview also indicates that such injus 
tice occurs not along axes of preferential and nonpreferential relations but 
along axes of domination and marginalization, axes of race, class, gender and 
nationality. Furthermore, much of this injustice emerges from our participa 
tion in structures of injustice. Most of us with moderate incomes cannot pay a 
just wage for care if society as a whole does not value and support caregiving. 
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Conversely, for marginalized communities in contexts where the fulfillment 
of basic needs is threatened and requires constant struggle, commitment to de 
pendents is not an expression of selfishness but a courageous work of both love 
and justice. It is in this context that we can understand, for example, bell hooks's 
description of "homeplace" as a "site of resistance." Homeplace is largely con 
structed by black women, and hooks defines it as "a safe place where black peo 
ple could affirm one another and by so doing heal many of the wounds inflicted 
by racist domination. . . . This effort has been and continues to be a radically 
subversive gesture."39 Drawing on the slave narrative of Frederick Douglass, 
hooks recounts the story of his enslaved mother, who sometimes walked twelve 
miles after a day's work to hold him while he slept, and twelve miles back to 
be in the field by sunrise, hooks describes her activity not as an expression of 
preference or of natural maternal desire but as "the political choices of this black 
mother who resisted slave codes, risking her life, to care for her son."40 Like 
wise, we can honor the phenomenon of "other-mothering" in the African 
American community described by Patricia Hill Collins, in which members of 
the community most able to provide guidance, shelter, and discipline to chil 
dren invest their energies in responding to the dependent care needs of the 
community.41 
Third, Outka conducts his analyses of the requirements of Christian love 
largely through a dyadic model of self and other. This model grows out of his 
primary concern with the proper extent of self-love and his sense of the strength 
of human sin and selfishness, which he then measures in terms of decisions 
about whether to pursue one's own desires or those of another.42 But this model 
is deceptive because we are always in relation to multiple other persons and, 
ultimately, in relation to all human beings and nonhuman creation. We are al 
ways deciding how we will expend our finite resources of time, energy, and ma 
terials to meet the almost infinite needs of persons and of creation. This real 
ity is perhaps most evident to those who are striving the most against their own 
limits of time and energy to love others: dependent caregivers meeting the ba 
sic material needs of others under conditions of marginalization and economic 
deprivation. 
As Martha Fineman notes, the private family has become the social repos 
itory of dependency so that society as a whole does not have to take responsi 
bility for dependency.43 Just so, I suggest that "special relations" function in 
Outka's theory as a repository for those relations that fulfill basic needs. But 
within that category they become invisible. In contemporary discourse, includ 
ing the Christian ethical discussion on special relations, we often speak of need 
fulfillment as something that we do for distant, unfortunate others, the prover 
bial "starving children in Africa," and thus we subsume need fulfillment under 
universal regard.44 Those who defend special relations often do not escape this 
assumption. They argue that strong families raise children into loving and 
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moral persons, and then concede that our obligation to love our children in 
this personalist sense must be balanced with need fulfillment for strangers.45 
However, most care and basic need fulfillment occurs primarily within so 
called special relations. It is only when such relations fail or, more likely, are 
crippled by injustice, that strangers are called upon to fill in the breach. 
The Debate on Special Relations 
The basic outlines of Outka's approach to agape have been adopted by a num 
ber of subsequent commentators, including William Werpehowski, Gilbert 
Meilaender, and Julia Judish.46 While exploring and supporting the importance 
of special relations, each explicitly assumes that these relations are separate from 
agape, because they are grounded in preference. Werpehowski and Meilaen 
der specifically repeat Outka's claim that special relations may be bounded and 
stabilized by agape, whereas Judish sees special relations as a school in which 
we learn the care that we later bestow outside of our inner circle of loved ones, 
which constitutes agape. 
Even those who contest Outka's understanding of agape as equal regard of 
ten accept his view that the Christian moral life consists of a balancing act be 
tween "universal" regard and particular obligations grounded in preference. 
The argument has then focused on the relative importance of these two com 
peting types of obligation in the Christian moral life. For example, Stephen Post 
argues for two "spheres of love," a "personal" sphere encompassing special re 
lations and an "impersonal sphere" governing relations with strangers. These 
spheres "compete for our moral attention."47 Those who have come closest to 
transcending the sharp agape-special relations split are those drawing on a tra 
dition that predates the modern version of the separation of public and private, 
namely, the Thomistic tradition. Edward Vacek and Stephen Pope fall into this 
category.48 Pope suggests that a reclamation of the Thomistic order-of-love tra 
dition helps to correct certain deficiencies that I have just pointed to in Outka's 
work but that (as he shows) exist as well in much contemporary Roman Catholic 
love ethics: the tendency to think in dyadic terms, to forget the "given" nature 
of many of our love relationships, to evade questions of multiple and conflict 
ing obligations, and to repress the "natural," including both our material needs 
and our natural inclinations to love certain persons—those related to us—more 
than others.49 
I find Pope's work the most promising approach to the integration of our 
responsibilities to those closest to us with our responsibilities to humanity at 
large. However, in light of my assertion that we need to bring together equal 
ity and dependency, we should remember that Aquinas's account of society is 
not at all egalitarian. Aquinas's conception of the order of love is pervaded by 
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the assumption of a hierarchically ordered universe, created and governed by 
God's providence.50 While we may share a notion of God's providence, we can 
not share Thomas's conviction that the hierarchical world order in which he 
lived mirrors that providence. Furthermore, in Aquinas's time, the contempo 
rary notion that we might engineer change to social structures to meet human 
needs simply did not exist. Today, we understand that we have the ability and 
the responsibility to shape our social institutions in accord with what we dis 
cern to be God's providence, God's justice. Today we are aware of connections 
to far-off strangers, including the children left behind by mothers from the two 
thirds world who come to wealthy countries to provide essential but invisible 
care to children, elderly, and disabled persons.51 We are aware that the choices 
we make—political, economic, and social—already help generate the "orders" 
or social and economic structures around us. Thus, we must seek a social or 
der that honors equality and also acknowledges and responds to dependency 
and need. 
Pope references the need to coordinate a contemporary account of an or 
der of love with a theory of justice.52 This task is a daunting one, but in light 
of deep injustices that now pervade our system of dependent care, I suggest that 
this task is also an urgent one. Outka would surely agree; his deep concern with 
the power of self-interest is an important reminder for those of us who would 
be too sanguine about relying on the goodness and justice of our natural incli 
nations to care for those closest to us. 
Eva Feder Kittay: Equality, Dependency, Care, and Justice 
In her book Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, Kittay of 
fers a "dependency critique" of the notion of equality as put forth in the lib 
eral tradition of Western philosophy.53 Kittay notes that the liberal conception 
of equality masks the inevitable human dependencies that occur in childhood, 
old age, illness, and disability. Kittay sets forth "a constructive philosophical 
project to establish the moral significance of dependency and care" (4). In par 
ticular, she is seeking a way to ground human equality while still recognizing 
the fundamental nature of dependency. She settles on the trope that each of us 
is "some mother's child" (19). We have each received the attention and care of 
a "mothering person" (not necessarily a woman or our own biological mother) 
in order to survive to adulthood; some person has considered us worthy of such 
attention and care. Thus we are worthy of such attention and care; to fail to 
recognize this worth is to dishonor not only us but also the mothering person 
who bestowed the care and, symbolically, all mothering persons as well as "the 
sanctity of the relation that makes possible all human connection" (68-69). The 
relationship between caregiver and dependent "is ubiquitous in human society 
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.123 on Tue, 22 Sep 2015 16:29:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Christian Love, Material Needs, and Dependent Care • 53 
and is as fundamental to our humanity as any property philosophers have in 
voked as distinctly human" (25). Such a relation points to a connection-based 
equality rather than an individual-based equality; we claim equality based on 
our relation to some other person (66). 
Kittay points out that the practical and moral demands of dependency care 
make the dependency worker herself highly vulnerable (49). Because depen 
dency work requires perception of and response to the dependent's particular 
need, it is best done in the context of an ongoing affective bond. Through this 
affective bond, the dependency worker frequently comes to see the depen 
dent's needs as her own needs, even as those needs compete with her needs. It 
is important that the dependent care occur in the context of a relationship; the 
caregiver is not fungible (53). Furthermore, the vulnerability of the dependent 
on the caregiver, and the compelling nature of the dependent's needs, impose 
a heavy moral burden on the caregiver. Often the care is necessary for survival 
itself. The caregiver thus has what Kittay calls a "derived dependency"; because 
of the burdens of her caregiving responsibilities, she is often unable to partic 
ipate in the economic and political spheres in a way that allows her to meet her 
own needs (42). In fact, human persons exist in a system of "nested dependen 
cies" (66-68). But because human persons also possess a moral equality, 
grounded in the notion of being "some mother's child," we must also recog 
nize the importance of reciprocity so that everyone's needs for care can be met. 
This reciprocity is not a two-party reciprocity because a dependent often can 
not reciprocate care; rather, it must exist in the form of a system of "nested ob 
ligations" (68). We all have a responsibility to ensure that the care needs of all 
human persons are met through both direct caregiving and care given to the 
caregivers. 
Kittay also analyzes the most influential contemporary theory of justice, that 
of John Rawls, from the perspective of dependency and finds it wanting because 
it assumes that "the bounds of justice are drawn within reciprocal relations among 
free and equal persons" (76-77). Kittay suggests that dependency is an "objective 
circumstance of justice," but Rawls does not recognize it as such (83-84). She also 
asserts that Rawls's two moral powers, "a sense of justice and a conception of one's 
own good," are not sufficient to encompass the pervasiveness of dependency and 
care in human life; she suggests an additional power, "a capacity to respond to vul 
nerability with care" (102). Third, she suggests that Rawls's list of primary goods 
should be expanded to include "the good both to be cared for in a responsive depen 
dency relation if and when one is unable to care for oneself and to meet the dependency 
needs of others without incurring undue sacrifices oneself (103, emphasis in original). 
Kittay suggests that in order to draw upon the Rawlsian notion of fairness, we 
must reconceive fairness to account for the fact that we exist in networks of nested 
dependencies that should evoke nested obligations (106). To do so, she draws on 
the analogy of the doula, the person who cares for a new mother while the new 
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mother cares for her infant.54 She states her principle of doulia as follows: "Just 
as we have required care to survive and thrive, so we need to provide conditions that al 
low others—including those who do the work of caring—to receive the care they need to 
survive and thrive" (107, emphasis in original). Kittay further notes that "this is a 
public conception of doulia," one that calls for social institutions to foster the work 
of love and care (108, emphasis in original). 
This rather cursory review of Kittay's work correlates in key ways to my dis 
cussion of concerns with Outka's approach. First, Kittay's entire book makes 
central the pervasive nature of dependency in human life, and, given the im 
portance of ongoing affective attachments in providing dependent care, the cen 
trality of special relations in human life. She demonstrates effectively that it is 
not possible to relegate dependency to a secondary stage in understanding the 
requirements of justice; dependency is not an exception to the rule that citi 
zens are freely cooperating individuals. Rather, dependency and dependent 
care mark a significant portion of human existence. This critique parallels my 
own critique of Outka's relegation of special relations to a separate problem, 
mentioned briefly but not resolved at the end of long works focusing on equal 
regard or universal love. Kittay's focus on society as a system of nested depen 
dencies and obligations points to the inadequacy of any analysis of Christian 
love conducted in primarily dyadic self-other terms. Furthermore, Kittay's 
analysis of the morally compelling nature of dependency work such that de 
pendency workers frequently commit to their charges to the detriment of their 
own well-being complicates Outka's powerful concern that special relations are 
a particularly fertile ground for the expression of harmful self-absorption. 
Another interesting aspect of Kittay's work, for my purposes, is her ground 
ing of equality in the status of each human person as "some mother's child." Kit 
tay's suggestion here, like most secular accounts of justification for a notion of 
human dignity and moral equality, raises certain questions about meta-ethical 
grounding that I cannot address here. Nevertheless, I find her suggestion quite 
compelling. Whatever we think may be the ultimate source of the obligation to 
care for vulnerable and dependent human persons, that obligation may be felt 
most generally and most powerfully in the relationship between parent and child. 
In addition, the trope of "some mother's child" interestingly brings together de 
pendency and equality in a way similar to my own reading of the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. As noted, the parable is striking for two reasons (and for their 
existence together). The identity of the caregiver, as a member of a hated group, 
and of the care recipient, as completely anonymous, highlights the obligation of 
every human person to offer care and the right of every human person to receive 
care. Flere is the source of Outka's notion of equal regard and the analogue to 
Kittay's concern with grounding equality. But what each person is equally enti 
tled to is precisely the compassionate, perceptive, responsive, and extravagant 
care that we need to survive and that is offered by the Good Samaritan. Kittay 
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argues that it is because someone has invested such care in us that we are all equal; 
the parable teaches us that all are equally deserving of such care. We might say 
that in Christian terms, we are indeed all "some mother's child," but the parent 
whose extravagant love demands we provide care is God. 
Finally, Kittay's work shows that our nested dependencies and nested obli 
gations call for a response that is not simply private but also social and politi 
cal, embodied in social networks, policies, and institutions. Our dependencies 
and obligations exist in a web, and that web is weakened and caregivers and de 
pendents are exploited when some members of society can extract themselves 
from it. At this point, then, we may ask whether in our time, in terms of the 
parable of the Good Samaritan, the man who fell among thieves is not actu 
ally a single mother raising children in poverty. Would Jesus not enjoin us to 
respond to the needs of these profoundly stretched caregivers, who are them 
selves fulfilling a compelling moral obligation, "proving neighbor" to their 
own children? It is not possible to raise these questions within Outka's frame 
work of agape as equal regard rather than special relations of extravagant care. 
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